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Abstract: Autonomy in bioethics is coming under sustained criticism from a 
variety of perspectives. The criticisms, which target personal or individual 
autonomy, are largely justified. Moral conceptions of autonomy, such as Kant's, 
on the other hand, cannot simply be applied in bioethical situations without 
moralizing care provision and recipience. The discussion concludes with a 
proposal for re-thinking autonomy by focusing on what different agents count 
as reasons for choosing one rather than another course of action, thus 
recognising their involvement in the decision process.  
Keywords: autonomy, agentic skills, bioethics, feminism, involvement, 
particularism, principlism  
 
Autonomy in bioethics is coming under sustained criticism from a variety of 
perspectives.1 In what follows, I consider different conceptions of autonomy and 
argue that either they fail to explain why we should care for autonomy, or their 
answer to this normative question is tied to conceptions of skillful or moral 
agency that cannot be imported unproblematically in the bioethical context. The 
critical argument, which takes up most of the paper, sections 1 to 5, aims to 
motivate a re-appraisal of autonomy in bioethics. I conclude with some 
programmatic remarks about the need to re-connect personal autonomy to 
moral autonomy. 
1. The Problem 
In their 2003 book, The Perversion of Autonomy, Willard Gaylin, one of the co-
founders of the Hastings Centre for Bioethics and Bruce Jennings, a senior 
advisor, describe the problem as follows:  
Our thesis in this book is that the morality of interdependence and mutual 
responsibility has been clashing with respect for autonomy with increasing 
frequency and harshness in the past thirty years and that autonomy has won 
these clashes too often. … When obeisance to personal liberty and 
independence triumphs systematically over relational, communitarian common 
sense morality, then a set of attitudes, unexamined assumptions, and a political 
and ethical style and rhetoric develop that we shall refer to as the ‘culture of 
autonomy’ (Gaylin and Jennings 2003, 4). 
Gaylin and Jennings argue that this culture of autonomy prevents what 
they call ‘common sense’ moral responses and cite as exemplary the case of 
William Black. When Black, a homeless man, is taken ill, his friends call for 
                                                        
1 See O’Neill 2002, Burt 2005, and Brudney 2009. 
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assistance from a nearby hospital. The ambulance arrives, but Black refuses 
treatment. At this point, his friends plead that intervention is warranted by the 
severity of Black’s condition. The paramedics do not treat Black who dies soon 
after the ambulance leaves. The example is intended to show how respect for 
individual autonomy, expressed in this case as respect for Black’s decision to 
refuse treatment, defeats expectations and obligations of mutual assistance.  
Gaylin and Jennings run together two distinct issues in this example. The 
first is what Christopher Coope in a recent essay calls ‘autonomania’ (Coope 
2009, 183). This is basically a phenomenon of bad practice, consisting in the 
failure of those who have the requisite expertise to assume the authority their 
expertise gives them and so also the responsibility, which comes with exercising 
this authority. The failure is upstream from commitment to the principle of 
autonomy, because, on this version of the criticism, respect for autonomy is a 
convenient means used by some professionals, perhaps under pressure from 
institutional targets or the threat of litigation, to serve a prior end, namely to 
minimise the weight of their responsibilities. So it is reasonable to suppose that 
given this end, other convenient strategies can be devised to attain it. 
Nonetheless, the diagnosis of autonomania, shows that there is indeed a problem, 
which consists in a shift of the burden of responsibility for decision-making from 
the professional to the recipient of advice or treatment who is lacking the 
requisite expertise and so has no expertise-based authority. As a result the 
autonomy promoted by this ‘do-it-yourself ideal,’ as Coope calls it, appears 
perfunctory. What would modulate, perhaps even reverse, this judgement is 
showing that respect for individual autonomy acknowledges or preserves some 
other kind of authority that is not expertise-based, but which is both relevant 
and important. Gaylin and Jennings suggest that this argument is currently 
missing. This, however, is not a cultural problem, it is unfinished conceptual 
business.  
The second issue is lack of care, which the authors attribute to a ‘culture’ 
of autonomy. This is a rather broad diagnosis aiming to draw attention to the 
deleterious effects of erosion of social and cultural bonds.2 At its heart is a 
conceptual puzzle that defenders of autonomy in bioethics have an obligation to 
address. Autonomy is usually understood as self-determination, which is a 
relation to self. Ethics, on the other hand, is primarily about our treatment of 
others and so our relation to others. Understood as a self-relation, autonomy, not 
only lacks any obvious reference to other-regarding considerations, it actively 
excludes them. The puzzle then is why should it guide our ethics? Compare for 
example autonomist ethics with self-interest based ethical theories, such as 
enlightened egoism or Aristotelian flourishing. The latter includes prudential or 
                                                        
2 Gaylin and Jennings's analysis of the moral costs of the culture of autonomy has continuities 
with what Christopher Lasch, writing in the late seventies, called ‘culture of narcissism’ (Lasch 
1979), and Charles Taylor, writing in the late eighties, described as ‘narcissistic individualism’ 
(Taylor 1991, 35).  
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instrumental justifications for complying with moral demands, for displaying 
virtuous behaviour and for cultivating philanthropic dispositions. By contrast, 
autonomy appears to encourage minimal interference by others and in the lives 
of others. This presupposes a rather exalted view of our powers and some would 
say promotes a perverted image of ourselves as godlike. 
2. A Defense of Autonomy and a New Problem 
The criticisms of autonomy in bioethics appear well-motivated and prima faciae 
plausible. The question then is why should the idea of autonomy continue to 
guide our ethics?  
Bioethical cases arise, for the most part, between parties that find 
themselves in asymmetrical relations of power. The powerful agent can be the 
state, the medical institution, or the medical professional. The weak agent is the 
group that is being legislated about, who may be excluded from some services or 
whose freedoms may be curtailed, or individuals who are already vulnerable, 
such as patients and their relatives who are the recipients of the professional’s 
decision. Respect for autonomy can play a role similar to the role some rights 
play, when they are used as trumps to halt intrusions in the individual’s life by 
powerful corporate entities, in a context in which there is no accepted notion of 
the common good. In a similar fashion, autonomy can be used as a trump-card 
the individual plays when a decision is made that is contrary to his well-being as 
he conceives it (Dworkin 1978, xi). A case that is routinely used to illustrate this 
function of patient autonomy in the context of mental health is the Re C case of 
1994.3 While detained in a high security hospital, a mental health patient 
developed gangrene secondary to chronic diabetes. Contradicting the doctors 
attending him, he refused treatment. The court judged that he retained decision-
making capacity with respect to life-saving treatment and granted him his 
refusal.  
In this trump-card role, autonomy stipulates non-interference in matters 
regarding the individual’s view of his own good. So the idea is that each should 
be free to choose their good as they see fit. Why should we go along with this 
idea? Autonomy as non-interference draws support from John Stuart Mill’s ‘very 
simple principle’ that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient 
warrant” (Mill 1989, 13). What justifies adherence to the principle are its 
consequences for human welfare. Of course, welfare considerations also justify 
coercive intervention. To decide whether the claimant holds a valid trump card 
or not, we need to look at overall or general welfare. But the very idea of a 
trump-card presupposes a context in which there is disagreement about how the 
good may be defined. If the normative foundation of autonomy as non-
                                                        
3 See Stauch 1995 for discussion of the case. 
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interference is welfare, then appeal to the principle can go in ways that negate 
autonomy, for example involuntary treatment orders. In practice, conflicts of this 
sort are left to the law courts to decide. But this practical solution does not 
relieve us of the conceptual obligation to justify individual autonomy, precisely 
in cases of competing views about the good. 
3. A Second Defense of Autonomy and More Problems 
Why then should we care for autonomy? Here is the context of our modern 
concern with individual autonomy as set out by Gerald Dworkin in his 
groundbreaking paper for the Hastings Center: 
The advent of new modes of behavioral technology raises important issues for 
our understanding of human nature and our moral views about how people 
ought to influence one another. On the theoretical level we find claims that an 
adequate explanatory scheme for understanding human behavior can dispense 
with notions of free will, dignity, and autonomy. On the practical level we are 
faced with claims of effectiveness, efficiency, and moral legitimacy for methods 
of influencing people such as operant conditioning, psychotropic drugs, 
electrical stimulation of the brain, and psychosurgery (Dworkin 1976, 23).  
Dworkin argues that we are right to consider these theoretical and 
practical developments as threats. It matters to us that our choices are our own, 
it is essential to our identity as agents. Autonomy both names this value and 
shows how it is realised by describing a relation between the agent and her 
desires and motivations. For this reason, I’ll call this conception internalist.  
When we respect someone’s autonomy, we recognise the authority of the 
autonomous agent to judge for herself. This authority is not based on her 
expertise or wisdom in running her affairs, it is authority she claims merely by 
virtue of the fact that these are indeed her affairs. In bioethics this person-based 
authority is worth our recognition John Harris argues, because “it is only by the 
exercise of autonomy that our lives become in any sense our own. By shaping our 
lives for ourselves we assert our own values and our individuality” (Harris 2003, 
11). Securing this sense of ‘our own,’ however, is precisely what the internalist 
conception fails to do. 
In the original paper, Dworkin offers the formula ‘autonomy equals 
authenticity + independence’ (Dworkin 1976, 26). The formula speaks to our 
pre-theoretical intuitions about autonomy: independence states that our choices 
should be free from external interference and authenticity that they should be 
ours.  
To define independence, we need to identify which influences or 
conditions are problematically external and so should be resisted. Alert to the 
fact that features of our ordinary moral lives, such as compassion or loyalty 
require that our actions be determined to some extent by the needs of others, 
Dworkin argues against substantive independence, which encourages the sort of 
individualism Gaylin and Jennings deplore. Instead, Dworkin defends procedural 
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independence by giving a list of hindering conditions such as “hypnotic 
suggestion, manipulation, coercive persuasion, subliminal influence and so forth” 
(Dworkin 1976, 28). These conditions aim to define the ‘right way’ of arriving at 
a decision so that it can count as autonomous. In part then, procedural 
independence spells out a requirement of agential control, that the agent has 
power over her will or at least that no-one else does. Even a perfectly controlled 
agent, however, would not count as autonomous, if her will is shaped by values 
she takes unquestioningly for granted. So independence is also about avoiding 
what Dworkin calls ‘false consciousness,’ encouraging critical reflection to 
identify insidious dependencies that cheat the agent of her autonomy.  
The problem is with the standard against which the contents of one’s will 
are to be judged. The internalist conception can only give us an inner standard, 
the true or authentic self. There is a trivial sense in which choices we make are 
ours because we make them. Authenticity is intended to give us a deeper, 
normatively significant sense of self. We are encouraged to undertake an internal 
audit to locate this self, but this is an impossible task. Of course, we often say for 
unimportant things, “that’s not me” and for important things “this is who I really 
am.” But we are also capable of mistaken self-ascriptions of identity because of 
self-deception or self-ignorance. Dworkin warns that if we insist on a ‘ground-
zero’ of agency, we make autonomy impossible. One may add, in support, that 
the ground-zero view is based on a simply false model of agency as causa sui. So 
we have to start with some motivations and then reflect on them. Standard 
hierarchical models of personal or individual autonomy, of which Dworkin’s is 
an early version, are premised on the idea that we make some motivation our 
own by endorsing it. As critics point out, however, it is one thing to have a more 
or less plausible endorsement account and yet another an explanation why the 
psychological feature that authenticates the decision is itself to count as 
authentic, and if it is not authentic, then the question is how non-authentic 
psychological elements give rise to authentic ones. This is the so-called ab initio 
problem. 
Defenders of individual autonomy have adopted two sorts of strategies for 
getting round this.  
The first strategy is conventionalist. Effectively, it does away with 
authenticity, starting with a basic self, consisting of a bundle of motivations 
acquired one way or another and an endorsement procedure. The advantage is 
that there is no need to respond to the ab initio problem. The normative weight 
is shared between decision procedures that are accepted as good or good enough 
and independence from manipulation, hypnotism, subliminal influence.  
The threshold for autonomy is quite low. It is low enough to count as 
autonomous those who consider themselves to be second class citizens because 
they have been raised in oppressive environments or respond to peer-pressure. 
Applied to bioethics this seems to confirm Coope’s original suspicion that such 
autonomy is perfunctory. But the bioethical autonomist would justifiably object 
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that this is too hasty a condemnation. Maybe conventionalism leaves something 
to be desired as a general theory of autonomy, but its weakness can prove a 
strength in the bioethical context. After all, we are not looking at the whole 
person, the concern is with specific choices about treatment; it is the choices and 
decisions about treatment that need to be autonomous. What we want then is a 
decent endorsement procedure. This is recognised in current practice through 
the notion of informed consent. The issue now is this: if consent is about signing 
at the bottom of a form, the perfunctoriness charge sticks. If, on the other hand, 
we take consent seriously, by recognising and trying to put aright the various 
distorting factors, including asymmetries of power and of knowledge, impeding 
social and cultural factors and so on, then we look to define not just an 
endorsement procedure but a thicker context of advice, discussion, education, 
advocacy and so on. This thicker context, however, presupposes a substantive 
conception of autonomy: the agent makes an autonomous choice if she properly 
and competently reflects on her options, wishes, aims and various facts of the 
matter. 
This brings us to the second strategy, which consists in advocating a 
substantive conception of autonomy. On the substantive model, the contents of 
the preferences or values of the agent are placed under normative constraints. 
These are defined in terms of competencies and skills that stop short of 
sensitivity and responsiveness to specific values. Some of these competencies 
include: “well-developed, well-coordinated repertoires of agentic skills” (Meyers 
2002, 21) that include introspection, communication, memory, imagination, 
analytical reasoning, self-nurturing, resistance to pressures to conform and more. 
Applied to bioethics this is unhelpful because more often than not the putatively 
autonomous agent is in a vulnerable position that inhibits the exercise of these 
skills. The threshold here is too high.  
At the same time, the indirect reference to contents can have perverse 
effects: by modus tollens, someone is counted as lacking the skills because of the 
content of her choices. This strikes me as relevant in the case of a refusal of 
treatment that reached the High Court, in which the patient’s request was 
challenged on the grounds that she is lacking agentic skills if she seeks 
discontinuation of her treatment that would lead to her death. Here is an extract 
from her witness: 
I felt that I was being treated as if I was being unreasonable by putting 
people in this awkward position. I fully accept the doctor’s right to say, ‘I 
personally will not do it,’ and I respect that position, but I was angered at the 
arrogance and complete refusal to allow me access to someone that would. I felt 
my path was being blocked and I was being pressurised to accept this option, to 
quietly go away conveniently, even though at tremendous cost to me and my 
family.4  
                                                        
4 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) 50. 
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The substantive model of autonomy is underpinned by a conception of 
what constitutes skillful agency. Autonomous choices are competently 
considered, ultimately, well-made choices. Because of this, the model allows for 
maternalistic interventionism; possession of ‘agentic skills’ confers on the agent 
the right to intervene in the lives of others less skilled than her, second-guessing 
their true choices. This problem is vividly illustrated in a division among feminist 
legal theorists who argue that recognition of women’s autonomy requires 
respecting women’s right to make bad choices and those who argue that certain 
choices such as consent to prostitution and sex trafficking can never be thought 
as autonomous.5 
4. Kantian Autonomy and Its Limits 
An important feature of Dworkin's internalist conception of autonomy is the 
thought that it matters that we recognise and respect individual choice. When I 
say that such and such decision is mine – I ask others to recognise that I made it, I 
endorse it, I stand by it. These terms describe agential involvement and control. 
The agent is involved in the exercise of her agency through judging something to 
be the right course of action and she controls the exercise of her agency by 
shaping her choices in accordance to her deliberations. 
Kant's moral theory contains a model of agential determination of ends in 
light of reasons based on “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will 
giving universal law” (Kant 1999, 81).6 He calls this idea autonomy. His is a moral 
conception. It provides the basis of an objectivist morality; the universalisability 
test formalises the notion of duty and directs us to reflect about ends we ought to 
make our own – so ‘mine’ is not just any end I have. Unlike the internalist 
conception, we are asked not to make a special case for ourselves and our 
interests. The specific Kantian formalisation of this familiar moral content is that 
we entertain others in our minds not as recipients of our legislative efforts but as 
co-legislators – as universally legislating wills – and therefore as fellow rational 
beings. The model of agency that supports this moral conception requires only 
that we are capable of acting for reasons.  
However, the reasons that secure a normatively robust sense of 
involvement and control are moral. This has advantages and drawbacks. The 
advantage is that the authority we respect when we respect each other’s 
autonomy has a rightful claim to our respect, it is the authority of morality in our 
lives. Moral autonomy sits awkwardly within the ineliminably plural aspect of 
moral deliberations in bioethics. We can neither count on nor enforce free 
                                                        
5 Representatives of the first view are Sullivan 2003, Sullivan 2004, Doezema 2005. For the 
second view see MacKinnon 2005, 242-48, and Auchmuty 2002. 
6 In the Akademie edition, which has become standard for references to the German, the 
reference is volume 4, page 431. For a more detailed discussion of these claims see Deligiorgi 
2012, 6-31. 
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uptake of moral injunctions. Even assuming such free uptake, the content of the 
moral duty will, very likely, be intrusively revisionary for some of the agents 
involved. 
Kant does offer also a juridico-political conception of freedom that looks 
much closer to the non-interference principle we considered earlier: 
“independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (Kant 1999, 393).7 
Such independence however does not quite fit the bioethical context because it is 
an answer to a question that is not ours: how is state law justified? Kant's answer 
is that it is justified through freedom: as a condition for the formal unification of 
a plurality of wills that preserves their independence.  
Of course, bioethical issues cut across political ones about what is 
allowable and what is fair. But they are also distinctly ethical, in a way that the 
justification of state law need not be. Consider for instance surrogate or 
substitute judgement, when we ask “what would the patient choose?”, the 
question strikes us with moral force (Brudney 2009, 33). Or consider refusal of 
treatment cases, when the High Court judges weigh the right of individuals to 
dispose of their bodies as they see fit and the social duty to protect the sanctity 
of life, they engage in moral as well as legal deliberation.8 Additionally, the 
plurality of wills that are involved in each particular bioethical situation need to 
reach a decision they actually agree with, because they will have a role in 
implementing it. Independence understood as freedom to pursue ends I have 
looks orthogonal to these situations, either because cure or health depends on 
changing my ends, or because obtaining what I want for health, cure, or some 
cases death, depends absolutely on the will of others.  
5. A More Radical Set of Criticisms and an Unsatisfactory Response 
If we are to defend autonomy in bioethics we need access to a normative 
justification for our conception that explains the intuition that respect for 
autonomy is recognition of an ethical value, but which does not presuppose or 
lead to unrealistic expectations of each other. 
In a recent paper about end of life choices, reliance on patient autonomy is 
described as a remedy for “the now discredited reliance on physician autonomy” 
(Burt 2005, 11). This agonistic way of putting things is interesting for two 
reasons. First, it reinforces the earlier point about asymmetrical relations of 
power, reflected here in the perspectival assignations of autonomy, which incur 
different obligations on the party that lacks it. What is unsettling about this pass 
the parcel picture of autonomy is that it fails to do justice to the thought that if 
we care for autonomy we care for it as beings who make choices, whichever 
position one is occupying in this situation. 
                                                        
7 The reference to the Akademie edition is to volume 6, page 237. 
8 High Court case Lord Justice Elizabeth Butler-Sloss Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] 
EWHC 429 (Fam).  
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Second, it illustrates the point made earlier that the bioethical decision 
situation involves by necessity a plurality of agents of whom very little can be 
assumed regarding shared intentions, shared moral convictions, or shared role-
based obligations. Parties in the bioethical situation start with already 
prescribed sets of rules (contracts, institutional, professional and so forth). 
Bioethical principles will have to sit atop these rules that already determine 
what each may do. 
Because of these features of bioethics, radical critics have urged that we do 
away with ambitious theory building or what Annette Baier calls the ‘vault’ view 
of moral theorising, that is a “fairly tightly systematic account of a fairly large 
area of morality with a keystone supporting all the rest” (Baier 1987, 55). 
Autonomy based bioethics fit this type of theorising because they place one 
principle, autonomy at the heart of the theory. The cost, Baier argues, is neglect 
of the particularities that give each case its specificity. In a similar spirit, 
Margaret Urban Walker criticises the practice of ‘armchair’ bioethics and 
‘decontextualised arguments’ and advocates that we resist the ‘pull to purity’ in 
moral theorising that has affected bioethics (Walker 2008, 7).  
Walker recommends a naturalised bioethics which is an ethics “committed 
to understanding moral judgment and moral agency in terms of natural facts 
about ourselves and our world” (Walker 2008, 1). It turns out that ‘natural’ here 
is intended to include social, economic, and cultural facts because we are 
naturally social beings. This pragmatic naturalism offers an entry point for 
feminist considerations about the inequality of openness of these social ‘circuits’ 
and the failure to treat people “under conditions of comparable respect and 
credibility” (Walker 2008, 3). The upshot is a feminist naturalised bioethics that 
rejects the ‘characterisation of moral reason as timeless and universal’ and is 
sensitive to ‘situated discourse’. Walker is not prescriptive about the method of 
such ethics, but overall the advice is that moral thinking should be driven by the 
specifics of the case, be critical and empirically informed.9  
The issue then is not theory-building as such. After all, moral theories do 
not arise in idleness, they arise because we confront problems that drive us to 
think deeper about our commitments and those of others, to try to find what if 
anything is justified, good or true even. Ordinary common sense is a fine guide, 
but sometimes it is not reliable or ought to be revised, which is the point of 
Walker’s insistence on the importance of critical reflection on our assumptions. 
Baier and Walker are not anti-theory just against the immodesty of a certain type 
of theory-building. In arguing for an alternative approach, they are raising a deep 
question about how we deal with moral situations, how we recognise that a 
moral response is demanded of us and what resources we bring in responding. 
                                                        
9 Walker characterises the contributions in the volume as “self-reflexive, socially inquisitive, 
politically critical, inclusive” (Walker 2008, 5), which would fit any number of different sorts 
of ethics and bioethics. See too her earlier monograph Walker 2007. 
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They offer a contextualist and particularist approach against a principle-based 
approach. 
What is wrong with a principle-based approach? First, we do not think 
morally in terms of principles (Baier). Second, we should not think morally in 
terms of principles; decontextualised theorising ignores large parts of our moral 
life and essential features of it such as relationships and the values that define 
them (Walker). Third, principles commit us to an inferential model of practical 
reasoning which is false, and more generally, principles do not seem to be very 
useful when we judge specific cases (Baier, Walker). 
The first point is perhaps the weakest. It is hard to see how one can accept 
it, for patently we do think morally in terms of principles, or some of us do some 
of the time. The claim would have more weight if it stated that although we take 
ourselves to be using principles (e.g. “do as you would be done by”), in fact these 
principles play no actual role in our deliberations. This would require an account 
of our deception, when we think we are using principles, but nothing like this is 
on offer here.  
The second point is easy to respond to because some principles, such as 
“love thy neighbour,” “honour your father and mother,” are just formalisations of 
relationships in terms of values (love, honour). So there is no antagonism here 
between approaches. Of course, principles are purposely designed to abstract 
from the particulars of the situation in order to be useful. They do not capture 
the rich texture and nuance of our moral life, because they are not meant to.10 
This brings us to the question, what use are principles for? This links with 
the third point against principles, namely that they commit us to a false picture 
of practical reasoning. Principles come in different forms and with different 
content, some look like rules “do this,” some look like facts “x is wrong.” We can 
think of principles as tools for unifying disparate cases. This is how they are 
supposed to provide guidance: when something is uncertain, we can use the 
principle to make our way into the unknown. In this way, they can be used by 
individuals and groups to steady outcomes and firm up expectations of 
consistency. In addition, they can perform a useful testing role enabling us to 
gain reflective purchase on our moral intuitions. Of course, other things too can 
perform this role, heeding other voices, attending to stories, examples and so on. 
But the point of this brief discussion of principles is that they can be part of a 
reflective process, which both Baier and Walker applaud, and they can also be 
reasons to which the agent responds directly without engaging in moral 
inferences.  
A currently popular defense of autonomy in bioethics offered by 
proponents of ‘principlism’ favours so-called midway principles. The purported 
                                                        
10 The application of principles is obviously a matter of context. So a principled approach is not 
ex hypothesis contrary to reasons holism, a position to which both Baier and Walker subscribe 
and which states that reasons that are good or bad in one context need not be so in another 
context.  
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advantage of these principles is that they are midway between formal and 
substantive. So they do not fall foul of the earlier criticisms of substantive 
autonomy, yet can accommodate the criticisms coming from a particularist 
perspective. Principlism aims to help us first of all recognise something as a 
moral problem and secondly offer guidance for how to deal with it. It is not 
intended as a general theory of the vault type, on Baier’s classification. It is 
designed from the start with a plurality of principles, “respect for autonomy, non 
maleficence, beneficence (including utility or proportionality), and justice, along 
with such derivative principles or rules of veracity, fidelity, privacy, and 
confidentiality” (Beauchamp and Childress 1994, 12). These principles are not to 
be seen as providing foundations for the theory. In addition, these are not 
justified a priori but empirically, the authors claim they are historically 
important, shared widely and embedded in moral thinking especially in the 
medical profession. This fits Walker’s empirical sensitivity recommendation and 
also what Emerich says about the role of bioethicists, since the proponents of the 
theory identify principles that are ‘generally held moral values’ and formalise 
them to help guide practical thinking. Finally, these midway principles are to be 
seen as non absolute; they are rules of thumb, which means that if one of them is 
ignored, then the agent is under obligation to justify herself. Other things, such as 
how they are ranked or which are most appropriate in judging a case, are, as 
Urban Walker urges, to be decided in context, so the principlist moral discourse 
is, despite its name, a ‘situated discourse’.  
Unfortunately the midway approach faces by now well-reheared 
difficulties. One concern is that the four core principles are not in fact as widely 
shared as the authors suppose.11 The position is intended to be flexible enough 
to fit different value contexts up to a point while overlaying them with a set of 
principles rooted in professional practice. But here a more urgent problem arises 
about shareability. Principlists do not claim that all morality is contained in their 
four principles, but they do claim that our common morality binds us. This 
means there are going to be considerations not caught by the principles which 
are nonetheless binding for some of the agents involved in the bioethical 
situation. In such a case the extra values and principles will not get recognised as 
such, and perhaps the moral import of the situation won’t get recognised. If they 
are, then we can add ad hoc values and principles hoping for the best, or a way is 
sought to connect these extra values and principles to the four core ones. 
Whatever the prospects of these amendments it should be obvious the 
possibility of these alternatives is damaging for the claim that the four principles 
offer a moral framework for bioethics.  
The problem is with the very nature of mid-way principles: they are the 
upshot of a negotiation that is supposed to be done and dusted before we start on 
the specifics but which for the reason just mentioned never is. 
                                                        
11 These criticisms are carefully detailed in Walker 2009. 
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6. A Possible Way Forward 
Kant's moral conception of autonomy stands apart from the other models we 
discussed because it links the demand that we should respect autonomy to the 
recognition that morality obligates us. This is a robust answer to the original 
normative question about why autonomy should guide our ethics and therefore 
have a role in bioethics. The problem with drawing directly from the Kantian 
source is that the model is prescriptive on the grounds of the objectivity and 
universal appeal of the moral demand. For reasons well-rehearsed in the 
literature, these grounds are not in fact shared by all those who find themselves 
in the sort of situations tackled by bioethicists. On the other hand, without a 
foundation in a moral conception, autonomy cannot be normatively secure. I 
conclude here with some programmatic remarks about one way in which this 
link can be established without ignoring the pluralism characterizing bioethical 
cases.  
A key element of Kantian autonomy is agential involvement; the agent is 
acting on her own reasons. Involvement is essential if the agent is to own her 
action. As we saw earlier, not everything the agent decides counts as her own; 
the agent is under obligations of reflection to figure out what morality demands. 
This morally demanding conception of what is to count as properly the agent’s 
own makes use of a thinner conception of what it is to act on reasons: the agent 
considers facts she judges to be relevant and then takes some as reasons for her 
choice to pursue some end.  
Though fairly minimal, this interpretation of autonomy allows us to 
envisage a normative situation that accommodates a plurality of wills, each 
starting with no prejudgement about the facts that are reasons for them. The 
facts that are reasons for each of the affected agents should be allowed to count 
prima faciae in the decision making. So unlike the pass the parcel picture we 
encountered before, autonomy as involvement is applicable to all relevant 
parties (noting that some of the facts that are reasons for some participants 
include facts about who should be included in the decision making). In addition, 
the model allows and indeed encourages negotiation, advice and so on, which 
were attractive features of the substantive conception of autonomy without 
cutting off those who lack ‘agentic skills.’ In short, it does justice in practice to 
the basic intuition, which motivates Dworkin’s original paper, that there is 
something about the mere self that is worth respecting, without committing to 
the problematic internalist model.  
A practical advantage is that involvement connects with a good deal of 
current practice so it is not unduly revisionist, it merely sets current practice in a 
different theoretical framework by focusing on what different agents count as 
reasons for choosing one rather than another course of action. On the other hand, 
the co-operation for the purpose of meshing agents’ aims that autonomy as 
involvement encourages is quite demanding, not least psychologically since it is 
hard to recognise as reasons the reasons of those with whom we share very little. 
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In addition, empowering those involved in decision making, especially those who 
are vulnerable and feel powerless, is time and resource-taxing. But these 
practical difficulties attend all serious joint attempts to figure out what the right 
thing is and to do it. Importantly, nothing secures the co-operative meshing of 
ends, because some facts that count as reasons for some of the relevant parties 
will not issue into actions, so some ends will be thwarted. As a result, some views 
of the good, as in the Millian model, shall prevail while others not, and some 
instances of maternalistic intervention will be allowed while others not. This is 
just a function of the pluralistic model we start with. On the other hand, 
involvement is much more promising, I think, in recognising the need for 
ownership of the decision by the agents involved and explaining why such 
ownership should be respected.  
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